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ABSTRACT

Desire Informing Philosophy in Plato: the Lover, the Tyrant, and the Citizen
by
Christian Bagrow

Advisor: Marie Marianetti

Desire informs the good and examined life by giving meaning to and requiring training for human
drives. In investigating Plato’s dialogues for how desire informs philosophy, comparison gives way
to a genealogical hermeneutic; the obvious want to find changes or discrepancies in Plato’s texts,
and Socrates’ words, gives way to interpreting congruent transformations of thought throughout his
corpus. Specifically, this thesis evaluates desire’s multitude of signification and significance
through the following the chronology: Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, Statesman, and Laws. That
human failing and ambition equally find desire couched between lack and satiation is radically
reconsidered in the course of the Symposium to aim eros towards the possession of the forever good
through love of the beautiful. The Phaedrus unites soulful love of the forms of beauty, temperance,
and justice in heaven with standards for soul-leading through the pitfalls of philosophy on earth; in
this reading, while desire is contingent for knowledge acquisition, the rigors of philosophy require
desire to undergo conscious measures of discipline. The erotic dialogues tend to posit eros in an
exceptional capacity. Holding eros to exceptional standards is corroborated by Socrates’ warnings
in the Republic to any erotically inclined person to beware tyrannical behaviors and nature. Yet the
whole picture of eros left impressed upon the reader of the Republic is complicated by the way in
which eros is accounted for in the beautiful city, diminished by the tripartite soul, and mitigated by
the interlocutors themselves. Though some political consequences of eros for the philosopher-rulers
in the beautiful city is fleshed out by the Statesman’s myth of two ages, where the condition of
desire both opposes itself to an automatic existence wrought by the gods of the ideal age and makes
love of wisdom possible, it is the emergence of the statesman’s ability to rule by recollection and
absence of the divine ideal that the presence of desire and volition in our present condition
becomes politically pronounced. In the Laws, Plato’s moral psychology is expanded from the
theoretical ambitions of the tripartite city/soul to the tangible bipartisan division between pleasure
and pain in order to permit the ordinary citizen of the demos that chance to live the good and
examined life. All in all, desire in general wills itself towards specific desire for wisdom, especially
when one confronts the ineffable.
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1. Introduction
From eros (love) to philia (friendly love), from thymos (spirited desire) to epithymia
(appetitive desire), ‘desire’ for the ancient Greek speaker took many word forms.1 For Plato, the
signification of desire not only has many facets, but it also varies in function, purpose and use
across his corpus, to the extent that one wonders whether Plato changes his mind on how desire
informs philosophy. There is much scholarly discourse on the comparison of the meaning and
significance of desire for Socratic practice and Platonic philosophy, particularly between the
Symposium, and sometimes the Phaedrus (the so-called erotic dialogues), and the Republic. By
including later dialogues the Statesman and the Laws in such a comparison, this thesis
hypothesizes that desire not only serves seemingly disparate roles for Platonic onto-epistemology
across this nexus of dialogues but also that there is an intellectually congruent transformation
occurring from praise of eros as companion for the exceptional lover, to warning of potential
risks and pitfalls of eros for the tyrant (and even for the philosopher), finally to expanding the
psychological scope of desire to inform the good life for the ordinary citizen. From disparateness
and a hermeneutic of comparison to congruency and a genealogical interpretation, this thesis
offers a novel reading of desire in some of Plato’s dialogues: from Socratic silence concerning
the presence of the divine to a Platonic rational theism, desire becomes tantamount to the divine
aspirations of humans in loving the process of knowing to such an extent that transcendent
virtue-forms unfurl themselves in the soul as from the ineffable. It is thus the very fact of human
desires being in flux and offering such drive that puts the good and examined life in our grasp.

Greek has many more word forms of ‘desire;’ those listed are prominently used by Plato. And while eros
has entered the English language (and is therefore not italicized), in ancient Greek, as this thesis in part
deals with, eros means many things more than sexual or erotic desire.
1
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2. Lessons from Lovers: Eros in Symposium and Phaedrus
The aim of the section is to reveal the philosophical value of eros as that value emerges
from both the Symposium and Phaedrus. These dialogues are considered collectively and in
sequence. Collectively, eros is not only a powerful motivational companion to train oneself
towards want of happiness in truth and the essence of existence, such as the essences of beauty,
goodness, and virtue, but it is also a contingent experience for the foundation of philosophical
learning and knowledge. In this reading, the ascertainment of knowledge is not possible without
desire first aiming at the divine goals of its human want. Thereby philosophy, as an exceptional
case of the ascertainment of knowledge, is not merely contingent upon the training of human
desires towards higher ends; desire is a requisite for philosophy to take place. In sequence, the
Symposium sets up an epistemological and ontological challenge, one of persuasion, that the
Phaedrus demonstrates how to deal with. While the Symposium announces the challenging
intersection of eros as ephemeral ambition and a path towards love of wisdom, the Phaedrus
articulates that the mania surrounding that intersection is by argument a contingency of higher
order knowledge and a foundation for proper dialectic and rhetoric. Where many readings of
Plato emphasize the epistemological obtuseness or difficulty of accessing the forms, this reading
emphasizes the accessibility of abstract knowledge when its acquisition is informed by
philosophically trained desire.
Towards the aim of revealing the philosophical value of desire, this section will first
evaluate a complex unity at the heart of the Symposium. I will focus on a tripartite nexus created
by the speeches of Aristophanes, Socrates, and Alcibiades. This nexus of comic, philosophical,
and Dionysian attitudes towards love postulates a contingency of desire that is pivotal to
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knowledge acquisition. This nexus is key because it opposes itself to other passages in the
Republic where reason leads the acquisition of knowledge and virtuous behavior. The comic
chimera of Aristophanic chances at love is embodied by the praise of Socrates by Alcibiades,
who arrives at Agathon’s house not expecting his prior teacher to be present. The Dionysian
latecomer’s praise is an example not only of the bitterly lost and scorned chances at sexually
consummated love but is also a dramatic repose of Plato’s that is designed to anticipate later
challenges to Diotima’s methods even as it reinforces through pretense the Dionysian lover’s
employment of those Socratic lessons of socially productive restraint. In short, when the
syllogistic whip used to train one’s beloved up Diotima’s ladder fails to corral the comically
satyric displays caused by love’s sting, the problem of ambitious desire in the process of
happiness-bringing philosophy becomes pronounced.
That pronouncement is the main concern of the Phaedrus. What does the mania
surrounding erotic desire have to do with philosophical rhetoric? Before Socrates uses the myth
of the chariots to illuminate the ontology of precarious becoming in relation to absolute being,
and the parallel epistemological opportunity afforded by manic desire for the beautiful, Plato
offers a general refrain of the problem of Alcibiades in the Symposium: one’s understanding
through love’s grip may be so socially entrained towards respectable ambition so as to forgo
philosophy entirely and miss the epistemic glance of the essential nature of reality that
disciplined desire can afford. Where Diotima’s account in relation to other components of the
Symposium exposit an outline of the lover’s best chances at transforming desire for the world
around them into productive desire for knowledge, the Phaedrus follows through on its
ambitions to espouse a recuperative onto-epistemology by exhibiting and giving rules for
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dialectic, setting the lover and leading the soul on the road to philosophy. These two dialogues
thus converge on an understanding of desire’s critical role in the life of philosophical inquiry.
2.1 Framing the Symposium
The Symposium is set within a frame of relation and remembrance that produces enough
temporal distance between the events of the men’s dinner and drinking party and Plato’s own
devices. Apollodorus, ‘the maniac,’ relates to an unnamed friend a story of the speeches of love
he had heard from Aristodemus, who, being a fan of Socrates, had went with Socrates on that day
to Agathon’s house some three or four years ago (172-174a).2 Plato frames the story in the
second hand to effect his authorship over the speeches of love and insists that such is an
advantage, even to listen, to philosophical conversation (173c). The whole of the Symposium,
then, is to be considered from a critical lens which espouses a love of wisdom as the motivation
for its provenance and telling. The significance of the frame returns to the fore of our attention
when Socrates finally delivers his speech as a remembered conversation between himself and the
priestess Diotima. Reconstruction of conversation parallels and signifies the reconstruction of
knowledge, and in this particular case of Socrates-Diotima, knowledge of the beautiful. But the
construction is something more. It is the ordering of human opinion against the divinely inspired
art of philosophy.
The early speeches in the Symposium provide an impetus for philosophical correction of
mere opinion regarding eros. Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan argue that the worth of
the speeches, contrary to critical consensus which observes those speeches as a mere backdrop to

The use of Stephanus pagination signifies either a paraphrase of or reference to the pertinent dialogue’s
text.
2
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philosophy, is found in their hierarchy of treatment of eros.3 That this hierarchy would reach its
culmination at the words of Diotima is best readjusted to reflect not only that the progressions of
encomia reflect the ascent up Diotima’s ladder, but also to reflect the "problematic images” of
the panorama of speeches. That is, the dialogue’s early speeches, from that of Phaedrus to
Agathon anticipate and problematize Diotima’s summit, especially as they collectively display
the transformation of knowledge as opinion into philosophical uncovering of reality as truth
(aletheia). Nowhere is this transformation more informative, poignant, and profound than in the
relation of Aristophanes’ speech to that of Socrates-Diotima. This is primarily due to a
juxtaposition of moods. Where Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Agathon treat eros with
varying degrees of pederastic social propriety, divine ordinance, and tragic nobility,
Aristophanes’ comic treatment gets at the ludicrous heart of longing and lack that besets erotic
desire’s livid livedness.
2.2 Aristophanes and Eros as Lack
The encomium of Aristophanes was re-situated in the evening’s order when the comic
playwright came down with a case of the hiccups (185d). This humorous beginning of
Aristophanes’ move to speech is somatic and reveals Plato’s attitude towards the juxtaposition
between Aristophanes’ mythic portrayal of love and Socratic insistence on the nature and
function of love for virtuous purposes. The former gives insight into the inclinations of paired
lovers only by implication whereas Socrates-Diotima will insist on the transcendent qualities of
eros, when it is trained towards philosophical ends, namely an abstract, immaterial, and formal
reality. Aristophanes’ speech, then, is critical as an ontologically complex predicate rebuttal to
Corrigan, Kevin, and Elena Glazov-Corrigan. Plato's Dialectic at Play : Argument, Structure, and Myth
in the Symposium, Penn State University Press, 2015, pp. 46-50.
3
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any insistence that love avoid its ungainly, human, bodily inclinations towards ephemeral
opportunities of fulfillment.
But the mythic speech of long-lost soulmate halves yearning to become again one does
more than exhibit the bodily nature of erotic desire in anticipatory predicate to the soulful
ordainment of love’s virtuous entrainment up a philosophically ordered ladder. It suggests a
comic-turned-surreal understanding of the tentative divide between dramatic insight and
philosophical ordering of reality. Plato has Aristophanes paint eros in a surreal light. The divine
origins of and godly agency in the bodily oriented predicaments of erotic activity mean that
Diotima’s own mythologizing of eros is both allowed to reevaluate Aristophanes’ divinely comic
tone and beleaguer his conclusions at the same time. The speech of Aristophanes anticipates a
conflict between the ethereal and the congenital contexts of eros.4 While this hermeneutic of
predication extends towards its ultimate fulfillment in the speech of Alcibiades, it also finds its
refrain in the myth-making of Diotima, which we evaluate later. But first, let us make evident in
the encomium of Aristophanes itself a tension between the divinely bestowed ability of the body
to guide itself in the making of a unity of love and the ‘problematic image’ coming from a
comedic understanding of erotic desire’s bisected repose.
Aristophanes’ myth begins with a description of three types of human beings; there is
male type, a female type, and combination of those two (189d-e). The shape of each being was
completely round; each had two heads, four arms and legs, and two sets of genitals (189e-190a).
They walked upright and ran “the way gymnasts do cartwheels,” spinning rapidly by thrusting

For an evaluation of the congenital nature and etiological value of the Aristophanic myth in the
Symposium, as well as the significance of Aristophanes’ speech in relation to Diotima’s, see Pappas, N.
Plato’s Exceptional City, Love, and Philosopher. Routledge, 2020, chapter 1.
4
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out all their eight limbs in whatever direction they wanted (190a). The male kind was originally
an offspring of the sun, the female of the earth, and the androgynous of the moon (190b). They
were spherical because they were like their parents in the sky (190b). They were great and
terrible in strength and made an attempt on the gods (190b). The gods met in council and decided
instead of eliminating the human race, which would eliminate the praise and sacrifices they
receive, Zeus would cut them in two: at once humans would lose their strength and increase their
profitability to the gods by increasing in number (190c-d).
So Zeus and Apollo arranged humans, smoothing out their wrinkles and cuts, to form
navels and breasts (190e). Since they were once one, they spent their time longing for their other
half, throwing their arms around each other, weaving themselves together, dying from idleness
and hunger because they would not do anything apart from each other (191a-b). Whenever one
half died they would seek another (191b). Humans at this stage of their development would
throw their seed on the ground for procreation, like cicadas (191c). So Zeus turned their genitals
facing each other and invented interior reproduction, in order that upon completing intercourse
they would return to their jobs and take care of their other needs (191c-d). Each human is then a
matching half of a prior human whole; each of us is always seeking the half that matches them
(191d). Those cut from the male whole human would be seek after men, those from the female
whole women, and those from the androgynous whole the opposite sex (191d-e).
So when a person meets the half that is their very own, something wonderful happens:
they are struck by a sense of love, belonging to one another, and by desire to not be separated
from each other, not even for a moment (192b-c). One may think that intimacy of sex becomes
paramount, but it is the joy and longing in the soul that hurts for something which speaks to the
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lover like an oracle’s riddle (192c). Eros is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire
to be complete (192e). If, says Aristophanes, we are to give due praise to the god who can give
us this blessing, then we must praise eros (193d). Love and longing is the best that can be done
for the time being, but for the future, with proper treatment, due reverence, and praise of eros,
perhaps he will restore us to our original nature, making us blessed and happy (193d).
The elemental core of Aristophanes’ contribution to Plato’s conception of desire in the
Symposium and Phaedrus, is that there is a unique affinity coupled with painful lack and origin
felt first by the body and second in soul which presents itself as erotic desire. Aristophanic eros is
a certain lack of then longing for physical recuperation. The soul’s longing is secondary to split
bodies’ yearning for wholeness. The would be divine cause of earthly yearning has its comic tone
due to the absurdity of Zeus’ and Apollo’s interventions. The gods’ fear of humans’ monstrous
ambition and strength becomes tantamount to human engagement with eros. And Aristophanes
would have humans praise this very same eros in the hope of becoming again monstrously
whole. Such praise is but a carefully veiled ruse. It is a satiric reproach of the divine nobility of
the surrounding early speeches in praise of eros. And it is predicate of Socrates’ insistence that
the search for the fulfillment of eros carries forward humans’ lack of happiness, when not
carefully tended. Aristophanes’ encomium conveys the pretense of humor in tipsily praising
desire when it really cleverly embodies lack and suffering and signifies the painful trauma that is
love’s tepid fulfillment. By rite of existence, humans originate out of violence, are damned to
fluke chance for romance, and cannot again have hope of healing without first praising that
which causes them pain. It is this emblem of dark humor that Socrates’ genuine search for
happiness in treating eros as lack will avail. And while Diotima characterizes eros as a particular
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striving, one which mitigates human lack by being an intermediary between gods and mortals
(202e), she develops the divinity of eros’ birth into a human moral regarding the good (205-206).
2.3 Eros and the Forever Good
So, what is the point of loving beautiful things or people, when, once they become ones’
own, one will have happiness only insofar as one possesses the good forever (205a, 206a)?
Diotima equivocates the beautiful object of desire’s lack with the object of the eternal good. That
is, striving for the happiness brought upon by fleeting pleasure fulfillment as lack, is really
striving, whether piecemeal or wholly, for the objective of the forever good. And what is the
pursuit of the good all about? It begins in giving birth to beautiful things in body and soul
(206b). In body, love finds in aim at overcoming love through the generation of offspring. This
striving for immortality via procreation and the production of offspring Diotima relates to the
ambitions of men who seek immortality through valor (208). Such is ultimately a paler
expression of the good and indicative of the in-betweenness of eros between the divine and the
human. Procreative ambition (and ambition beyond the recall of valor, to anticipate Alcibiades)
repositions the Aristophanic element of eros as a primarily physical affinity produced by longing
and lack within the structure of Socrates-Diotima’s argument so as to take seriously the problems
innate in the praise of eros as something incomplete or intermediary. Hence Diotima’s insistence
that being in-between ugly and beautiful, divine and mortal, eros itself presents both a unique
opportunity and challenge to that immortal part of humanity, the soul (209b). But pregnancy of
the soul, when men beget customs and ideas of wisdom, virtue, and temperance, which were
perpetuated in them by something eternal - their soul, is a far more deathless sacrament.
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By virtue of both accounting for the Aristophanic element of bodily affinities and the
self-serious element of the pregnant soul, we are told at this crux in the Symposium that the
movement between metaphysically local and transcendent ideations is not only possible but that
desire requires discipline and education to normatively transform the locus of its affinity from
the local to the transcendent. That is, the proper rites of instruction and revelations through
education, can mitigate the body’s imperfect experience of desire as lack. That knowledge of the
good (and the beautiful) is a higher happiness, and a more long-lastingly immortalizing ambition
than is begetting physical offspring is clearly Socrates-Diotima’s view. The intersection of a
physically preoccupied desire and a metaphysically local ambition is the warning that Alcibiades’
Dionysian mask will demonstrate. We see that Socrates-Diotima claim that a productive ambition
of philosophy is the amelioration of desire as human failing, and we will see in the Phaedrus that
Plato is concerned with recuperating desire as onto-epistemologically contingent instead of
merely productive. But first let us look more closely at the implications of the ascent proposed
by Diotima, and what it means in relation to both Aristophanes’ contention that praise of eros is
really praise of human failing and Alcibiades’ complex embodiment of such a predicament.
Lovers in their youth go about fulfillment of their desire by devoting themselves to
beautiful bodies (210a). Upon begetting beautiful ideas from that love of one other body, the
lover should realize the beauty in all beautiful bodies (210b). More than this, the lover ought to
realize, says Diotima, that the wild gaping after just one beautiful body is a small and diminutive
pursuit and despise it (210b). From this the lover may reason that something essentially beautiful
in a person may not be their body but something else eternally blooming (210c). From the
essential beauty to be found in all bodies, the lover may begin to see the beauty in laws and
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customs (210c). And experiencing the beauty of customs leads to discovering the desire for
knowledge (210c). The desire for knowledge lends itself to loving a sea of beauty, that is Beauty
itself (210d). For Beauty itself never passes away or comes to be; it is not beautiful sometimes
and ugly another; Beauty is not beautiful relative to perception, nor time, nor place (211a).
Beauty is always in one form, and will not appear to the lover in any instantiation, except as the
beautiful participate in the one form (211b). When set aright, this is what the lover comes to
know and desire, learning of the one Beauty and what it is to be beautiful (211c).
The ‘object-oriented’ interpretation of the ascent as a would-be bane to ‘interpersonal
love’ espoused most prominently by Gregory Vlastos accuses Plato of favoring a cold,
unsympathetic, and egoistic understanding of love,
We are to love the persons so far, and only insofar, as they are good and beautiful. Now
since all too few human beings are masterworks of excellence, and not even the best of
those wehave the chance to love are wholly free of streaks of the ugly, the mean, the
commonplace, the ridiculous, if our love for them is to be only for their virtue and beauty,
the individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the
object of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato's theory. It does not
provide for love of whole persons, but only for love of that abstract version of persons
which consists of the complex of their best qualities. This is the reason why personal
affection ranks so low in Plato's scala amoris. . . . The high climactic moment of
fulfillment—the peak achievement for which all lesser loves are to be "used as steps"—is
the one farthest removed from affection for concrete human beings.5
Martha Nussbaum qualifies Vlastos’ above view, which has dominated the scholarly debate, by
reminding the reader that,
There is a problem about using this as a criticism of Plato's perceptions. This is that it
requires us to treat as Plato's view only the view expressed in the speech of Diotima as
repeated by Socrates, and to charge him with being unaware of the rest of what he had
written. For following that speech is another speech that claims to tell us the truth—a
Vlastos, Gregory. “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato's Dialogues.” Platonic Studies, Princeton
University Press, 1973, pp. 1-34.
5
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speech that ends with these words: "One could find many other wonderful things about
Socrates to praise. But these same virtues one might attribute to someone else as well.
The really wonderful thing about him is that he is not similar to any other man, past or
present. . . . This man is so strange—he himself and his speeches too—that you could
look and look and find nobody even near him" (221c-d). But that is, more or less, what
Vlastos was talking about. If a writer describes a certain theory of love and then follows
that description with a counterexample to the theory, a story of intense passion for a
unique individual as eloquent as any in literature—a story that says that the theory omits
something, is blind to something—then we might want to hesitate before calling the
author blind. We might want to read the whole of what he has written, and find his
meaning emerging from the arrangement of all its parts. I sense that a deep understanding
of the Symposium will be one that regards it not as a work that ignores the prephilosophical understanding of eros, but as one that is all about that understanding.6
Nussbaum rightly corrects Vlastos’ commentary by first simply positing that the view of
Socrates-Diotima must be considered within the context of the whole dialogue. And second more specifically - the tension, or lack of, between abstract and personal understandings, the
former of which Vlastos criticizes, is redoubtably affronted in the speech by Alcibiades. Plato
seems thus very much aware that - even if we are to wholly take Vlastos’ egoistic view of
interpersonal love to heart - sacrifice of something monstrously human must be made to gain the
virtuous ground upon which philosophical sciences stand. Hence my critical inclusion of
Aristophanes’ encomium expands upon Nussbaum’s first point by insisting that Plato does not
make disingenuous the darkly comic tone of an Aristophanic position - the uniqueness of a
lover’s choice - but rather predicates and distinguishes the unique challenge of Diotima’s upon
the plurality of understandings that is the Symposium’s early speeches. It seems unfair to the
drama of the dialogue and dubious to its implicit arguments to interpret Socrates-Diotima as the
sole voice of Plato. I claim that Plato’s voice may only be found in an interpretive hiatus
accruing from his topic-specific contradictions and transformations across multiple dialogues.
Nussbaum, Martha. “The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of Plato’s Symposium.” Philosophy and
Literature, vol. 3, no. 2, John Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 131-172.
6
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Moreover, to reprimand Vlastos’ detached reading with Nussbaum’s reminder that the
dialogue is in fact all about a ‘pre-philosophic’ understanding, reiterates that Socrates' recitation
of Diotima’s wisdom is to be taken critically as a life-long challenge, which is considered
productively within Plato’s readers’ task to espouse a complex understanding of the role of eros
in philosophy from within his corpus of interlocution. I would further disagree with Vlastos,
however, on the brunt of his accusation because Diotima’s speech is aimed not at a postChristian psychological dispensation of loving blindly, which comes from a theological tradition
of seeking to bridge the divine and the human by saving human fault from the need to account
for divine hatred and retribution. That is, why keep Plato beholden to notions of interpersonal
love that treats other people as an end rather than a means. For Diotima, however, eros is the
intermediary between what is divine and what is human. Eros in this view is a desire not for the
perhaps unconscious human drive to praise its own failings, desire is not human lack nor is it
interpersonal love for the innate qualities of humans, regardless of whether those qualities are
beautiful or not. Eros is, as Socrates says, a blessed workman or companion in the task of finding
the roots of happiness - albeit a ‘pre-philosophical’ happiness - in the erstwhile most base of
human drives: desire.
Diotima’s ambition for desire, then, is not to address interpersonal love as a monstrous
lack, or lack’s refinement as love of innate qualities. Her ambition is to elevate desire from a
phenomena with the power to denigrate eros with tyrannical appetite to one that helps humans
aspire to virtue and happiness, regardless of whether this means human interaction is
instrumental. The rules of epistemological engagement and transformation which are seemingly
adjacent to Diotima’s ascent are not explicit in the Symposium. (I will argue that epistemic
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paradigm is suggested in the Phaedrus and subsequently qualified in the Republic.) For this
reason, critics like Vlastos may easily surmise - within a narrow view - that Diotima’s view of
eros in the Symposium fails to give an adequate account of interpersonal love. I find this to miss
the mark of what eros, for Diotima, seems to offer by way of a normatively intellectual
asceticism or mysticism, and to miss what Plato offers in this nexus of speeches.
But as Frisbee Sheffield argues, the claim that Plato ignores loving someone for their
innate qualities, for their own sake, and instead treats others as object-predicates for some
idealistic fulfillment of an artificial affinity to a transcendent, absolute, and ineffable objectreality, such as the form of Beauty, is hard to ignore. Sheffield argues that,
The ‘ascent’ does not, as is commonly held, show us interpersonal love transformed from
earthly (physical) attachments to divine ones. All it shows is that the desire for happiness
is (a) believed by Socrates to be satisfied in the acquisition of wisdom of a certain sort,
and (b) that within the context of the acquisition of wisdom beautiful bodies and souls
have instrumental value as objects of understanding.7
I find that Sheffield’s argument does not do the whole of the Symposium justice and certainly
does not afford the possibility that in striving with eros as a means to engage the enduring end of
happiness and fulfillment, something ‘pre-philosophic’ is happening, which sets SocratesDiotima’s pursuit apart from the other speeches. That is to say, why cannot the ascent, in the
context of the drama of the Symposium and the mythology of the Phaedrus, be read as the very
transformation which Sheffield denies? And indeed, Sheffield will go on to problematize the
interpretation that persons are mere instruments,
Whether this is the only value that persons have for Plato, or how exactly persons are to
be valued within a happy life are further questions not addressed by this text. There is
good reason for this. In an account of eros one does not expect to be able to answer such
Sheffield, Frisbee. " The Symposium and Platonic Ethics: Plato, Vlastos, and a Misguided Debate".
Phronesis vol. 57, no. 2, 2012, pp. 117-141.
7
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questions along the lines that Vlastos and others have used in the interpretation of this
text. There may be all sorts of contexts in which individuals are valued – and for their
own sakes. This is just not the concern here. The aim is to show how eros – that area of
desire concerned with the acquisition of good things and happiness for oneself – plays a
role in the good life (the expressed agenda is to praise eros, 177c). This amounts to
giving an account of the sorts of things that human beings should desire and pursue as
rational agents concerned with their own good and happiness. That is precisely what the
ascent shows.8
Diotima’s ascent intimates the things humans should desire insofar as that desire concerns itself
‘with their own good and happiness.’ Therefore there may be conflict between one’s own
conception of happiness and Socrates’ suggestions, there may be conflict between eros’ strides
and a pre-philosophy. And on that note we are reminded of Nussbaum’s second point above, that
of the speech of Alcibiades, where the stoic focus of Socrates on philosophy is one cause for
Alcibiades’ love.
2.4 Bitten with Philosophic Eros
Alcibiades’ particularizing speech in praise of eros as unrequited desire felt towards
Socrates manifests a sadness at the heart of Aristophanes’ speech and implicitly warns the reader
of the pitfalls of mistreating eros as yearning for physical fulfillment of lack. For Alcibiades,
praise of eros is praise of Socrates, not his teaching. In his lament, Alcibiades finds many reasons
to treat Socrates with complicated feelings, acting as both the lover and the beloved in the hopes
of consummating his love with Socrates. For Alcibiades, the Symposium’s herald of the
Dionysian drunken woe found between lack and satiation, praise of eros is a celebration of one
man above all others. And that celebration, Alcibiades speech, is driven to and fro in a vain effort
to make sense of the experience of his innermost heart, his soul, being bitten with philosophy
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(218a). Socrates’ response to Alcibiades’ loverly request exemplifies the challenge of
transforming - or transferring - love of beautiful objects into love of Beauty itself. For Socrates
responds to Alcibiades’ love’s aim of making himself a better man by insisting that if Socrates
has the power to make Alcibiades more virtuous, then Alcibiades must be seeing in Socrates a
beauty beyond the visceral or ephemeral (218d-e). But, Socrates gently warns Alcibiades to think
twice: Alcibiades permits his preoccupation with earthly beauty - even when he sees beauty as
something essential rather than tantamount - to make insurmountable or forgotten his rightful
aim towards the form of Beauty. Alcibiades’ bitten soul is left in painful lack as his erotic
ambitions feel the pull towards the beauty within a single other rather than progressing to the
essential beauty in all. Hence Alcibiades’ lament at 219b-c is of such a satyric character, that we
wonder if Plato is insisting not only on the exceptional rigor and difficulty of Diotima’s ascent,
but whether he is also formulating a challenge to the reader to learn from Alcibiades’
embarrassment and focus. That is to learn from Alcibiades’ treatment of desire as tending
towards earthly ambitions of fulfillment of lack rather than towards the forever good. Alcibiades’
almost manic display, his philosophically bitten soul tormenting his failure to praise eros
philosophically, demonstrates his want for Diotima’s goal without the wherewithal to look
beyond the metaphysically local and visceral.
So, in this reading of the Symposium, how does desire inform philosophy? We have at the
fore the metaphysical complex of Socrates-Diotima where local somatic experiences of affinity
are transferred gradually to experiences of the transcendent ideal when eros is companion and
workmate. This complex of desire which aims to produce a particular kind of knowledge and
thereby maintain an intimacy with the forever good for the express sake of human happiness,
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comes in-between the Aristophanic expression of desire as physical recuperation of lack and that
expression’s manifestation behind the Dionysian mask of Alcibiades. In short, we are given the
philosophical aim of desire without any requisite epistemic tools being explicated. Are we to take
seriously, for example, the claim that eros is like opinion, which instead of straddling the inbetween of ignorance and knowledge, is intermediary between the human and the divine between the metaphysically temporal/local and the absolute/transcendent/ideal, when the
Symposium offers no philosophical evaluation of said claim? We are left with the drama - mythic,
comic, and satyric - that surrounds the philosophical aims of desire. We are dramatically left
without a proper dialogic evaluation of the claims of Socrates-Diotima, even as the nexus of
encomia highlighted here reveal a major human shortcoming in focusing on the visceral drama of
long-lost, unrequited, lack fulfilling, or otherwise dispensary experiences of desire. For in that
focus there is not only the lost chance of philosophical gains, there is also literary yearning for
the further explication of the ways and means of the ascent. In this way, the dialogue’s praise of
eros is as philosophically incomplete as it is emancipatory of the possibility of the many to
pursue desire’s intellectualization for the aim of the good and examined life.
2.5 Exceptional Eros: from Mania to Soul-Leading
Perhaps the Symposium suggests an exceptional attitude towards desire informing
philosophy. Indeed, when we visit the debate surrounding the appetitive desire typical of the
tyrant in the Republic we will see that blindly following one’s desire is liable to corruption of the
soul, fosters an inability to see the world philosophically, and results in bitter or unaware
unhappiness. But before Socrates exhibits trepidation towards desire in the Republic, before he
favors an explication of the soul that relegates desire’s psychic function and philosophical
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purpose to reason, Socrates explicates the ontological arena - complete with epistemic issues - of
the exceptional case of eros in the Phaedrus. The Symposium and the Phaedrus read like a pair
of dialogues concerning eros, with Socrates in the former broadly addressing what he elaborates
on in the latter. And while I disagree with John Moore when he asserts an uncommon chronology
that Symposium follows Phaedrus, I do agree with him that the comparison of the two dialogues
is “inevitable.”9 Nicholas Pappas outlines this inevitability,
I take Plato to have written the Phaedrus after the Symposium, and to have written it in
part to improve upon Diotima’s theory of erôs. The myth in the Phaedrus permits love to
mean “This is what you really are and where you’d been,” only departing from what we
now call experience inasmuch as bodily existence has dulled the memory of what
experience once had been. Love in the Phaedrus reunites companions from the
disembodied days in which they rode their chariots together around heaven. When
one feels the right erôs, which is the kind caused by divine possession, lovers can
claim everything that was true about Aristophanic love yet hope for everything that is
good in the love that Diotima spoke of. The right kind of love now both restores
and improves. All we need to make the Phaedrus’s solution work is proof that
erôs is divine. Divinity solves the problem of bodily love only when divinity differs
from what already exists among bodies. Socrates calls the erôs he endorses “righthand” love, to set it apart from the ordinary gauche variety of being love-crazed.
But then the Phaedrus finds ways to question this directional distinction, leaving its
progress beyond the Symposium in jeopardy. Indeed we wonder whether any dividing
line within the body’s world can represent the line that sets that world as a whole
apart from the divine world as a whole. The salvational erôs that breaks the
depressing rule of earthly erôs threatens to be inconceivably exceptional. … On this
account the Symposium presents love as the return to one’s original nature but
presents that hope in dangerous and unacceptable form. Socrates answers that story
with the teaching about love that he attributes to Diotima. Diotima’s alternative
frees us from having to accept an antisocial erôs; but in the process she also
jettisons the thought that love is restorative. The Phaedrus then portrays Socrates
putting forward a view of his own that takes up what was appealing in Aristophanes’
story and gives love’s recuperative power a new and socialized meaning.10
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Pappas articulates well what is at the heart of these two dialogues. But I would emphasize that
the Socrates' endeavors in the Phaedrus, giving “love’s recuperative power a new and socialized
meaning,” digress from the theme of this thesis only insofar as one lets the impetus of Diotima’s
agenda for desire inform general lived experience instead of informing exceptional philosophical
living. I agree with Pappas that exceptional experiences are at play and I would further
emphasize that from the Symposium to the Phaedrus, the main aim remains making sense of
desire for the philosophical life. The line of dialectic as it plays out in the Phaedrus, demarcating
the divine from the mortal, the exceptionally manic desire from the philosophically useless or
harmful, ultimately gives way to Plato’s adjudication that the significance of desire is not
whether it is productive, restorative, or recuperative, but rather is its liability to entrain
exceptional contemplation and knowledge at all. That is to say, will Socrates’ adjustments in the
Phaedrus permit Diotima’s challenge to all who desire anything outlast Plato’s longer-term
issues with desire’s fickle Aristophanic or tyrannical nature and effects. Is eros merely an
exceptional case whereby desire of an erotic nature can inform philosophical thinking when
matched with rational transference to discourse of a particular rigor and kind? Do Plato’s views
of desire, as they progress across the chronology of the dialogues, evolve in such a way so as
manifest Diotima’s ladder? That is, do the early dialogues permit the more visceral implications
of desire-fueled actions to become teaching-moments later in life? Or must we attempt to
reconcile Socrates’ views in the hopes of interpreting Plato on the question of desire’s role in
informing philosophical thinking, virtuous behavior, and a happy and examined life?
I argue that the Phaedrus is pivotal and key to understanding these questions. It is key for
fleshing out what the Symposium presents as a problem. And it is pivotal in positing a wider
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claim regarding desire’s relationship to philosophy across Plato’s corpus (at least those evident in
this thesis). As we will see, the Phaedrus addresses the onto-epistemic exceptionality of eros for
philosophy. Taken to task by both Aristophanic lack-fulfillment and Alcibiades’ blinded, ‘bitten’
ambitions of tepid desire for wisdom, Socrates will articulate the congruence of desire and
philosophy by defending Diotima’s vision of a ‘sea of beauty’ against the corruptions of bodily
desire untrained. But it is not merely that the division between divine and human souls is the
contingent upon which knowledge of the eternal forms of justice and temperance and beauty is
possible for earthy souls with earthy appetites to recollect. The metaphor inherent in Socrates’
palinode in the Phaedrus insists that the metaphysical complex of Diotima’s in the Symposium be
reevaluated to include the soul’s desire and the action of knowing that results from that
ontological contingency of aspiring divinity. That is, the transference of desire from the local
instantiation to the transcendent ideal form is repositioned with desire operating within the nature
of the non-divine soul in heaven insofar as desire predates the kind of thing we experience
through as eros and see as beauty on earth. Diotima’s process of transference still ought to occur
on earth, but it occurs for different reasons - namely the soul’s ability to have had experienced
affinity as lack, to have anticipated fulfillment, and grown healthy from satiation - or ill from
lack thereof. The effect of this reconceptualization from the Symposium to the Phaedrus is that
the experience of the soul’s desire is fundamentally predicate to the problems which desire
present to the embodied soul. Even if the notion of a soul offends our tastes, the metaphor of the
soul’s desire is still rightly provocative. One might as well say that our unconscious desire
predicates the conscious affinities one acts on to such an extent that the latter are contingent on
the former. And the nature of that preconsciousness dictates its effects of cognitively aware
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desire on subsequent contemplative powers and their effects on behavior. But the Phaedrus is not
just about ontological clarification or epistemological ability. Its Platonic significance lies in the
pairing of Socrates’ palinode concerning eros with his dictations on dialectic, rhetoric, and
philosophy.
As has been well noted, the unity of the Phaedrus is difficult; the first part deals with
various treatments of eros while the latter concerns itself with rhetoric and logos.11 I would
highlight Jens Kristian Larson’s treatment, where the passage from 270-271 relates dialectic back
to the guiding of the soul,
The myth of the soul, describing the essence and the form of the soul, seems to be what
we need in order to turn rhetoric into art. So perhaps it is not so absurd to say that
dialectic, as described in the Phaedrus, is not a universal method which enables us to
acquire knowledge, but is really about soul, nor to say that Socrates' second speech
delivers knowledge of the soul and that this knowledge enables him to deceive Phaedrus,
where the deception must be understood, of course, as a noble lie, implanting reasons and
customary rules into Phaedrus.12
Two problems ensue, according to Larson: (1) The dramatic or literary qualities of the dialogue
resist unification due to Phaedrus’ evident resistance towards being moved by the content of
what Socrates says. (2) Socrates’ proposals for the soul’s philosophical impetus in his palinode
seem to make the logical reconciliation of rhetoric with philosophy impossible. That is, the
precision with which one may speak of the soul, coupled with the necessity for that precision to
make rhetoric rigorous enough to be philosophical not mere opinion, makes Socrates’ intent only
viable when one considers the Phaedrus in light of Diotima’s requisitions for philosophical
See Murray, James S. “Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (‘Phaedrus’
261-266).” Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 21, no. 4, Penn State University Press, 1988, pp. 279–89. See also
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inquiry. Hence, the Phaedrus is the key to understanding the plight of desire’s effect on
philosophy as it is enjoined in the above nexus of speeches from the Symposium. But the
Phaedrus also demonstrates argumentative issues with enjoinment and unity of philosophy and
eros. James Kastely calls the logic that unifies the Phaedrus “associational.”13 Kastely observes
that it is through rupture of categorical congruency that the divide between the theory and
practice of rhetoric becomes philosophically interesting.14 Furthermore, the erotic contingency,
the bitten-ness of one’s soul as Alcibiades would put it, of Socrates’ rhetoric in the first part of
Phaedrus is so over-coded or non-evident come time of rhetoric’s theory in the second so as to
lack the beloved’s soulful and bitten passion for philosophical inquiry at all. The point here is not
only that the instrumental love of the Symposium’s beleaguered expression of philosophical
transference from physical lack to contemplation of the ideal is manifested in the Phaedrus’
latent rupture between the theory and practice of rhetoric, but also - and perhaps more
significantly - that demanding eros or desire be pertinent for let alone contingent of philosophy is
not ordinary but rather exceptional. That is, the problem of the unity of the Phaedrus
demonstrates the exceptional difficulty of transmuting desire of the ordinary into desire for the
philosophically extraordinary.
And what does the Phaedrus really say about that difficulty? Lessening Larson’s first
problem of drama and focusing of the second problem of unity of logoi or reasoning, Jessica
Moss claims that the Phaedrus is really a treatise on a serious kind of persuasion called soulleading (psychagogia),
Kastely, James L. “Respecting the Rupture: Not Solving the Problem of Unity in Plato’s ‘Phaedrus.’”
Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 35, no. 2, 2002, pp. 138–52.
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The two parts consider two methods of soul-leading, love and rhetoric, and the dialogue
as a whole asks how either or both can be successful in directing the soul towards truth
and the good life. The events of the dialogue—Socrates' attempts to seduce Phaedrus
away from his infatuation with Lysianic rhetoric and towards devotion to philosophy—
dramatize the endeavour, and unify the two proposed methods: we see Socrates engaged
in an attempt at soul-leading, using as his tool Phaedrus' love, not of another person, but
of rhetoric.15
In uniting the dialogue under the theme of soul-leading, Moss too performs an analysis driven by
‘associational’ logic. So, too, it is the ruptures in types of soul-leading that makes the dialogue
not only philosophically interesting but also a statement - in conjunction with the Symposium on desire’s ability to be variously successful towards the aim of a philosophically driven life. The
Phaedrus shows us the exceptional difficulty of eros acting as workmate and companion for a
philosophical life; for only in the case of eros being workmate with a beloved who has a
philosophical soul - an earned ability to train the soul’s parts towards want of satiation from the
truth - is the exceptional and good love, which is on display in the palinode, contraindicated by
the bad love for pleasure from beautiful rhetoric which does not seek truth. To posit such a
thematic unity of the Phaedrus offers insight towards that contraindication between
philosophically productive and harmful desire only insofar as soul-leading is a function of desire
for either Beauty itself or for beautiful rhetoric. Insisting that the Phaedrus is not ruptured belays
any necessity for the Phaedrus to really address the Symposium’s challenge for a philosophical
life. Specifically, what - in light of eros as the divine intermediary and the human workmate does desire for beautiful arguments and a science of knowledge look like? The Phaedrus answers
this question with paradox.
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On the right hand we have the gift of erotic mania which is bestowed at those moments
when earthly beauty is cognate to the form of Beauty. So too, presumably, this modality of
recollection incurs experiences of manic desire when earthly instantiations of Temperance and
Justice are witnessed. We get really excited when we witness truth. That is, due to an
ontologically exceptional predicament of the well-trained heavenly soul, we might, once
embodied, experience a preternatural affinity towards not just Beauty, but also other
instantiations of the absolute essences of truth and existence. On the left hand there is a more
mundane affinity towards the pleasurable experience of argument and rhetoric. Though the same
epistemic modality is at play and the same ontological predicate is at hand, rather than
consciously aiming for truth, the non-philosophical aim is merely for artful arguments and
rhetoric. If eros is to be intermediary and workmate in the task of sorting philosophically
pertinent desire from mere desire for earthly instantiations or imitations, why does Socrates
follow his praise of mania with a calm and dry discussion over dialectics, rhetoric, and opinion?
This rupture in the Phaedrus points not only to paradox but also highlights the philosophical
methods which necessarily ensue. The paradox is that the ability to induce philosophical
contemplation in oneself and others is due to both predicate and antecedent ontic conditions of
the human being. That is, we need earthly beauty to recognize what came before in heaven but
we need heavenly beauty to contend with philosophical knowing on earth. We experience both
the manic desire of eros for beauty and the cool-hearted desire for beautiful philosophical
conversation. The contemplation of truth above mere emotionally gratifying rhetoric in the
context of the paradox of the Phaedrus evaluates the Symposium’s postures, where the former
demonstrates the exceptional difficulties of the task of eros a workmate that the latter sets out.
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Once the erotic mania is behind us, what are we left with? We are left with the soulleading tasks of the philosophical life which are far more mundane and demanding, should we be
so inclined to pursue them. There is rupture between the manic and socialized aspects of such
desire but there is also unity in the methods of leading souls. Plato seems to suggest that though
the fiery spits of erotic desire do indeed inform philosophy, we cannot forgo the lessons of the
lover and permit that mania to steer our embodied souls-in-training away from want of truth
towards pleasant-in-arms rhetoric. Aristophanic lack stifles philosophy when the former socially
inhibits the latter from moving beyond visceral lack. Perhaps the visceral moments of love can
indeed be transferred to desire for customs, for knowledge, and for truth. Perhaps we can yearn
for knowledge long-separated as we do for our ‘other half.’ Indeed Socrates suggests, implicitly
in the Phaedrus, that if the division of desire between good and bad (philosophical and not),
resulting from self-analysis in due course of such a transformation or transference, cannot occur
organically with one’s beloved or interlocutor, then the exceptionality and rigor of philosophical
inquiry must come forth with reason not necessarily by desire, especially if opinion is to be
avoided. This is not without consequence. For as much as we may readily agree that a desire
such as love is only philosophical under the proper inception and educational training,
philosophical inquiry cannot forget that, like rhetoric changes opinion and like love transforms
our vision, it means to change lives. Desire informing philosophy is not, between the Symposium
and Phaedrus, so much an act of conceptual reconciliation or interpretive maneuver as it is a
demonstration of intellectual perseverance and maturity. Knowing what and how one desires can
become tantamount to leading the good and happy life. But it is the position of this section,
finally, that though desire may be - under exceptional circumstances - the basis for philosophy, it
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may also be a bane or at least unphilosophical. As we will see going forward, the lessons of the
lover, of eros the workmate, even those of philosophically mature desire, will come under
scrutiny, when Socrates evaluates the role desire plays for the soul’s assenting to behavior in the
Republic.
3. Desire in the City: Eros in Republic
The aim of this section is to evaluate the supposedly contrarian views of eros as put forth
by Socrates in the Republic. In the erotic dialogues Socrates praises the blessings of eros as
companion to the divine-aspiring processes of philosophy and as workmate to the development
of the philosophical soul in the face of seemingly human madness. The distinction there, outside
the city, seems to be drawn upon lines of divine and human excellence as the former permits and
the latter limits. In short, in the erotic dialogues, eros engages the soul in leading itself towards
knowledge-objects of transcendental formal realities. The knowledge acquired upon those
plateaus of a life-long journey is contingent upon desire’s entrained affects and has subsequent
ethical implications for how one allows desire to inform behavior. We need manic eros to help
our souls see beyond the earthly vicissitudes which an embodied soul experiences as opinion in
order to postulate, understand, and ethically live with the actual and essential truth of the reality
of things. Outside the city, it seems, the mania of eros can indeed be properly socialized as the
individual human’s experience of the absolute matures, thereby tempering itself with reasonable
approaches to ineffability and living the happy life in light of what such philosophic endeavors
mandate.
In the contrived beautiful city, however, those human pangs and divine throes, which
elsewhere amount to properly socialized manifestations of eros and its corresponding

26

philosophic habituations, are cast off in seeming fear of how tyrannical devolutions inevitably
evade or plunder the reasonable soul’s ascent towards the absolute and ineffable. This reasoned
fear, I propose, is indelibly that of Socrates when he sets out to edify in words a beautiful and
just city. In striving for justice, Socrates eliminates the good kind of manic contingency of eros
for philosophical life and instead proposes an erotically sterile, socially communitarian,
politically meritocratic, intellectually programmatic, and soulfully prescriptive upbringing of a
machine of a city whose inhabitants’ constitution is metonymically bound to a mundane,
functional, and a-poetic rendition of the parts of their souls. There is here a deep mistrust of eros
to help humans achieve what Socrates elsewhere knows it can - the good and happy life. That the
beautiful city of the Republic is purposefully a fascistic and misanthropic rendering - insofar as
eros is valuable - tells one that Socrates’ vision of justice is not only deeply related to eros, albeit
by its absence, but also that for Plato, eros ought to be even more socially constrained and
intellectually directed than the erotic dialogues let on, especially in the context of Diotima’s third
and second highest plateaus: love of laws and institutions as well as love of knowledge.
To understand the intense qualification of eros that the Republic performs, this section
will evaluate four features of the dialogue’s arguments. First Socrates’ articulation of the soul and
the city into three parts and classes demonstrates how a just polity ought to psychologically
ground its normative customs and political processes. Desire, both in terms of affect and appetite,
is relegated to reason just as the masses of the city, both producers and auxiliaries, are subject to
the rule of the guardians. Thus the beautiful city is an authoritarian one where desire en masse is
constrained - not unlike eros according to the erotic dialogues ought to be trained - upwards in
order to advance a philosophic way of life for the few. Second, despite these conceptually
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amenable-to-eros overtures upon the soul and political bodies, the beautiful city itself is to be run
with programs of eugenics and communitarianism thereby eliminating the social milieus of
family and courting which would otherwise ingratiate even a non philosophic class towards eros
as workmate. Instead the city is to be devoid of erotic inclinations; its autochthonous origins and
its social and political structures are meant to fundamentally alter then artificially propagate an
apparatus of physical and emotional control of the populace. Reason is king and desire is merely
a necessary constituent force to be put in line. Third, there is a tension in the dialogue between an
implied eros amongst Socrates and his interlocutors and Socrates’ open derision of the tyrant’s
manic eros. The care, patience, amicability, and perseverance exhibited between Socrates and
Glaucon and Adiemantus (and others) are all indicative of not only an obvious desire for wisdom
but also of a personally and philosophically mature eros. In this way, the dialogue manifests the
lessons from lovers. And yet, fourth, Socrates’ enunciations against the tyrant’s madness wrought
by eros in Republic Book IX seem general enough to escape the context of the beautiful city
insofar as Plato means to qualify the erotic dialogues’ praises of divine madness and its capacity
for philosophic transformation. Ultimately, the contextual arraignment of eros in the just and
beautiful city sets the ground for Plato’s essential and exceptional rather than overt or
fundamentalist understanding of Diotima’s challenge. Erotic desires are essential to the
philosophers love of the beautiful and good in and of itself; but erotic desire is exceptional to the
philosopher in acting as blessed workmate.
3.1 Desire and the Divisions of the Soul/City
Looking for individual constituent classes of the just city that would coalesce into a
meaningful whole and parallel the virtues of the city - moderate, courageous, and wise - Socrates
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leads Glaucon to consider the parts of the soul which also constitute the different classes of the
city (434d, 435b). Glaucon agrees that the will to achieve the end goal of a desire, to ascertain
one’s wants and to fulfill them, is made possible with the assent of the soul (437c). The soul is
the seat of preconscious will that promulgates conscious action. Socrates’ observation of soulful
action thus need not be differentiated necessarily according to a valuation hierarchy of parts or
activities. Yet Socrates conflates that hierarchy, those of the virtues of the city corresponding to
types of people and their function, with the parts of the soul in order to justify and validate the
stratification of roles, which individuals in the just and beautiful city differentially play. In order
for the analogy of the city/soul to be valid for making analysis and conclusions in both
directions, that is one component of the analogy lending knowledge and insight for the other and
vice versa, Socrates must insist that even though - the relation of something differential to
another thing that is differential is not the same as the relation of a part of a thing to itself critical insights may be garnered across the divide (438b-d). And in those relations drawn
between knowledge sets of particular sorts there may be critical difference even though the
overall comparison of sets remain valid (438e). Socrates seems blithely aware that comparing the
city to the soul and using analysis of the parts of the soul to argue for normative positions
regarding the classes of the city is only as valid as one is willing particular aspects of a thing to
relate to particular aspects of a wholly different thing. In short, Socrates’ city/soul metaphor selfconsciously ignores that individual desire exhibits different phenomenal forms than does the
desires of collective individuals. Socrates deliberately mistakes a part of the whole for the whole.
Eric Brown examines the issue of the “unearned unity of the soul” and finds that Socrates avoids
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a singular sense of psychic consciousness.16 Though Socrates’ oversight is seemingly accounted
for by the conceptual parallel of the parts of the soul with the virtues of city, the argument by
relation of particular thing is tantamount, in the case of soul, to appetitive desire becoming in a
class below that of spirited desire and reason, and in the corresponding case of the city, the
producers existing in a class below the auxiliaries and rulers. There is no complex unity of the
city except for nominal justice just as there is no earned unity of the soul except for virtuous
action.
The consequences of disparateness and the relegation of desires to reason is threefold.
First, in the soul, the inferiority of pleasure, base passions, and appetites to honor, noble passions
and spirit is an inherently ethical differentiation. The subjugation of both these types of drives to
reason, however, goes beyond an ethical consideration. The rule of the logistikon over the
thymoeides and epithymetikon is different than the rule of nous. Socrates’ use of logistikon
implies a mathematical orientation, a calculable foresight, and a logical process to self-leading
rather than merely the dominance of the substance of mind over body, or for that matter, rather
than the divine position over the human. Second, in the city, the inferiority of desire to reason
implies, by relation, an authoritarian hierarchy of some class of individuals over others based on
the impetus of the soul towards assenting to behavior, which is invariably not essential to that
general class of person, but to the individual’s ability to learn and employ some calculated
restraint. Such restraint is amenable to environmental factors such as education and testing, and
is therefore potentially inculcated even as Socrates’ proposed meritocratic rigidity of class is not
amenable to much social mobility beyond an early age. Third, that the ascent from the cave as
Brown, Eric. “The Unity of the Soul in Plato’s Republic.” Plato and the Divided Self, edited by Rachel
Barney, et al., Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 53-73.
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well as the philosophers’ recognition of the intelligible world, which is guided by reasonfavoring thought and rule rather than by desirous love of the visible world, is clearly a corollary
of the tripartite soul and divided city. This system of philosophic-political power is therefore
grounded in a particular psychological impetus to train desires, eros amongst them, towards the
height of ineffable reality and understanding. The Republic’s ascent through the visible realms of
apperception towards the intelligible ones of the forms and the forever good is not mutually
exclusive of the epistemological journey one must take when eros is workmate up Diotima’s
ladder.17
Socrates’ characterization of the soul at war with/in itself hyperbolizes the assumedly
fundamental political tension at work between desire and reason. This supposed civil war in the
soul is a result of a conflation, via a logic of relation, of the political phenomenon of conflicted
or frictional classes of individuals with the psychic phenomena of cycles of repression and selfactualization. By converse, the ruling concept at work against such a civil war is, for Socrates,
that of harmony and health (443d-e, 444c-d). The above assumption is problematic. Socrates
seems to argue that desires of the soul produce unified conscious action and therefore types of
people, even though actions - conscious or otherwise - are primary evidence of the essentially
partitioned qualities of the soul. Perhaps one can wave this away by calling the soul’s assent to
its body’s actions dynamic. Even so, such dynamism - or ‘unearned unity of the soul’ diminishes the capacity of the soul to be in harmony except where the immortal soul is already of
a particular dispensation towards what Socrates et al might come to agree is healthy or
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harmonious or natural. Appetitive desire, at the most somatic level those desires for food - and at
the most ethical level those desires for wealth and pleasure, is moreover contraindicated by the
inconsistent metaphysical modality of divided-soul pre-agency and united-soul virtuous actions,
evidenced by courage of the spirited part coming forth alongside natural or healthy appetitive
desires. David McNeill argues that the Republic represents both an immanent attitude towards
the soul (i.e. its unified recollection of the ideal realm) and holds that the discursive activities,
which require assent from the parts of the soul in the visible realm, are autonomous from the
intelligible realm.18 It remains, then, that Plato’s view of human nature in the Republic holds
itself to a bifurcating locus of power to discern good from bad between the parts of the soul (i.e.
reason’s capacity over desire) and the unified beliefs and actions of the whole soul to feel and
know. That is, the soul believes (or reasons) what courage is with one part but acts courageously
with another, even though the whole of the person reaps the consequence of their actions. The
tripartite soul psychology requires a metaphysically local intransigence of agency to recollect
what the soul knew before it was embodied; parts of it forget the divine aspirations of sublime
desire such as awe for the transcendent beautiful or good just as another part recollects.19 The
relegation of reason over desire forgets what eros offers by way of intermediary with the divine
in order to justify the wholly human political stratification of functions and ability in the wouldbe just city.
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The calculations of reason are to the noble spiritedness of virtuous and honorable desire
as the rule of the philosophers is to the maintenance of order by the courageous guardians. I take
it that this is the core of Socrates’ intent in dividing the soul into parts each complete with
moralized capacities. While it is an essentially moral enumeration that bolsters the life of justice
in the city, Paul Ludwig argues, for instance, that the distinction between eros and thymos exists
to overtly separate philosophical and political life.20 The forever good is to the transcendent
knowledge-object of the philosophers as the institutionalization of ethical behavior via
punishment is to the authority of the guardians. Justice as such is an authoritarian regime’s aim
where hierarchical realms of knowledge are - in effect - maintained as the source of moralpolitical power. Ludwig’s observation fails to account for the knowledge contingent structure of
the city, when one considers that the distinction of thymos and reason is paramount over that
between erotic appetite and thymos. Socrates offers no mixing of parts of the city/soul so as to
produce an emergent capacity that belays authoritarian hierarchy or fascistic social behaviors via
the effusions of a freely wheeling or even trained eros. The people’s desires are not to be trusted.
Justice is the congruent force felt by every person properly occupying their place. In this way, the
noble aspirations of desire is tainted by Socrates’ insistence that honorable courage is that which
keeps the beliefs of the people in check. The slipknot of the political structure of the just city
tightens around the systemic and collective interaction between spirited desire and reason, not
around the individual’s capacity to raise their understanding of the world according to their own
experience of the sublimity that noble desires so often afford. The calculable fear which drives
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such a theoretical slipknot of justice is of course not to be dismissed out of hand as it itself is a
kind of argument informed by a particularly emotive yet elevated desire.
Yet it is unclear from Socrates’ city/soul analogy the extent to which the philosopherkings draw upon lessons learned from their own sublime or empathic or even dispensary erotic
desires. The process of learning from false assumptions during the ascent from the cave may not
be entirely the purview of the reason-part of the soul (490a-b). Similarly, the testing of innate
capacities, the test of the metals, is a show of one’s entire soul. The education of each class is
splayed across the spectrum of appeal to each part of the soul, at each stage of multiple
meritocratic way-points, depending ultimately it seems on the harmony and health and aptitude
of the entire soul, first by music and physical training and then later by mathematic and the logic
of dialectic. But once one is firmly within the class of ruler, the ability of the soul to rule itself
(i.e. the ability of the philosopher’s to rule the city) is both dependent on having personally
mastered one’s desirous soul-parts - no doubt requiring extensive knowledge as to the extent they
influence behavior and belief - and also on having politically mastered those who presumably
have not spent as much time in contemplation of the truth of the ideal realms, let alone the
reasoned and philosophically calculated distinction between the sensible and the ideal realms. As
for the emergence of the just and beautiful city, the politically salient division between opinion
and truth may not be only a capacity of the reasoning part of the soul when one considers that it
is the contingencies of ignorance and desire amongst the producers and the auxiliaries (not to
mention esoteric desire amongst the rulers) that permit the possibility of justice to occur. That is,
for the just city to occur, ignorance and opinion must be ruled nominally not fundamentally by
wisdom and truth. And while the divine blessing of eros may not have an explicit place in this
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arrangement, it certainly bears resemblance to the tedious existence of workmate for becoming
that is the entire collated social structure and makeup of the just city.
3.2 Eros in the Beautiful City
Of the many behavioral stipulations of the Republic’s city, the proposed social rules
concerning eugenics, coed nudity, dormitory living, women’s equality, and abolition of the
family seem specifically designed to reorient human interaction away from classical Greek
customs of eros as a transparent yet nuanced stage for the force of public passions and towards
the strictly justice-serving actions wrought by thymos or spirited desire. Paul Ludwig argues that
the modern understanding of eros misses entirely the semantic scope of eros in antiquity, which
served “higher aspirations of patriotism and cosmopolitanism,” and therefore provided a bridge
between private and public spheres.21 Far surpassing mere sexual denotations, eros implies a
psychological dispensation where passions have express and varied social consequences. From
base sexual arousal to the noble love of state, eros is employed as a complex concept which
could ingratiate itself to many carefully enumerated contexts. Moreover, eros in antiquity often
operated to cause aspirations of high functioning in overlapping milieus, playing as crucial role
in romantic courting (though arranged marriage was commonplace) and elite pederasty as in
public rhetoric and political discourse. In the Republic, however, such overlapping milieus of the
private and public are eroded in favor of a living fascistic aesthetic of state commitments, as eros
becomes replaced with thymos, which makes the noble lie possible.
The noble lie has two parts and one overarching function. The function of the falsehood
is to get the people to love their city and its purpose without question or pause (414b). The first
Ludwig, Paul W. Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory, Cambridge
University Press, 2002, pp. 1-23.
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part of the lie regales the autochthonous birth of the founder of the city and the second part
involves the extent to which that original genetic makeup, the metals of their souls, must be
preserved in order to maintain births pure in ambition, ability, and honor (414d-e, 415b-c). That
ambition is the defense of the city, emanating from the part of the soul that desires out of want to
assent its behaviors to the virtues of moderation and courage. That ambition does not involve the
machinations wrought by the passions of eros. Such restriction is implied when Socrates and
Glaucon agree that private property ought to be abolished, the citizens ought to eat together in
mess, exercise together in the nude, and sleep in dormitory style: for if they had any of the
converse of these things, the city’s citizens would spend their whole lives hating and being
jealous, plotting and being plotted against, more afraid of internal than external enemies
(416e-417b). In short they must be friends who possess everything in common (424a). The
negative emotional and psychic energies of eros are thereby dispelled in favor of more ‘noble’ or
controllable psychological dispensations, not only by theory of the tripartite soul’s relegation or
rejection of eros, but also by the reorientation of the possibilities of agency to perform actions
with a spirited desire that is by inculcation of the noble lie inseparable from the love of the city.
In the just city, the legal status of women as property and caregivers of children is also to
be abolished. Instead, given that there is no proof of women’s better or more proper ability to
care for children, the task of childrearing should fall to men and women equally (451d-455e).
Moreover, women should also be warriors and have equal footing in the guardian tasks of the
state, as long as the women receive the same education (457a-c). Since women as child bearers
are to be held in common - the people not really knowing who the parents of a child is since
women and men share sex with multiple partners - the private sphere of eros is effectively also

36

abolished. The marital and oedipal arrangements which reinforce eros as a political force
buoying both the private and public spheres is abolished so that the herds of producers,
auxiliaries, and guardians remain as free from dissension as possible (458d, 459e). Sexual
communitarianism is thus designed to eliminate the aspect of eros which exists as 'love of
something that is mine.’22 Feelings of sexual desire clearly are still operable in this situation, but,
first, the social consequences of private families vying for power and influence are reoriented as,
second, the conviction from having pleasure and pain influence one’s greater political behavior is
no longer a function of calling a thing ‘mine’ but rather ‘ours’ (464a). The erotic feelings of lack
due to loving something beautiful because one cannot see or does not have that beautiful thing in
oneself is transformed via these communitarian aims and stipulations into a noble or socialized
desire which is invaluable to the just and good city.
3.3 Eros between Socrates and Glaucon
After realizing that the innumerable consequences from building a model of a good city
in words cannot all be anticipated, and before realizing that they must discuss some philosophy
(e.g. epistemology and ontology) for their model to be tenable, Socrates and Glaucon question
whether or not they are wasting time (472a-b). Their general love of fine discussion, of minding
objections and reiterations, comes to a brief standstill as they reflect on the reasonableness of
their endeavor. For indeed the Republic occupies quite an extensive length with a single and
complex discussion taking place. Socrates refines their pursuit from one by which a city would
inevitably ensue to one by which they can show a city to most possibly ensue from their
theoretical propositioning (473a). Socrates even asks Glaucon not to laugh at his change of tack
For further reading see the introduction in Levy, D. Eros and Socratic Political Philosophy. Palgrave
Macmillan US, 2013.
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(473c): the city they have been discussing is not possible without philosophers leading the way
(473d-e). Moreover, there can be no happiness, public or private, in any other city than the one
where philosophers rule (473e). Glaucon protests and Socrates insists that philosophers are fit to
rule because they know to love not a part of something but the whole of it (474b-d). Socrates
asks if Glaucon remembers this stipulation to which Glaucon replies he does not because he does
not understand it (474d). Socrates says that it would be appropriate for anyone but an erotically
inclined man to not understand (474d). Socrates proceeds to show that Glaucon’s eros is trained
towards understanding the beautiful parts of male youths, insinuating that Glaucon’s eros is not
mature enough to yet be philosophical, or one which would love every part, desiring the whole of
the thing (475b).
This passage is an important reminder of what eros looks like between mature adults. It is
the profound possibility to reconnoiter and incite one another’s love of seeking after knowledge
and wisdom and truth, even with more base pleasures - in this case love of beautiful youths acting at least as a point of distinction and at most as the intellectually motivating starting point.
Eros, in this way, is not really about the pleasure of beautiful sights coming into the pleasure of
beautiful ideas, but is rather about the personal relations which make the process of philosophical
maturity and insight possible. Eros is not therefore only about transforming love of the part into a
philosophical love of the whole, but also about having the patience, perseverance, and insistence
- the love of another - to see them through the difficult steps of erotic transformation by dialogic
investigation of arguments. Socrates exhibits eros that he says may be characterized by both the
stings of the gadfly and the care of the midwife. Moreover, following this passage is Socrates’
famously tongue-in-cheek comparison of philosophers to mere lovers of sights and sounds
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(475d). Upon first glance, the voracious love of all sights and sounds is similar to the
philosopher’s love because philosophers love the whole of things, not missing a single one.
Mistaking the two might be easy without the mature eros of Socrates, that of teacher, leading the
way and, in this case, drawing out the conclusion with Glaucon that philosophers do indeed love
all sights and sounds but strive beyond those things towards a love of the sight of truth. Eros is
about fulfilling ones potential though possession, taking the risk of mistakes or rejection that
love affords, to go beyond beautiful things in order to posit belief in the beautiful itself. Thus
does mere opinion differentiate itself from truth. Eros - both love of the beautiful and care for
those who love it - undergirds not only the possibility of possessing that insight, but also the
selfless discipline of the lovers to see it together.
3.4 The Tyrant’s vs. Philosopher’s Exceptional Eros
Socrates’ view of eros in the Republic is neither singular nor is it, as I have shown,
wholly contrary to some aspects of eros as presented in the erotic dialogues. At several points in
the Republic, for example, Socrates mentions in passing the eros of the philosopher as seemingly
different from regular appetitive desire and exceptionally crucial to the philosopher’s acquisition
of knowledge and ability to rule (490a-b, 499b). Similarly exceptional, it seems, is the eros of the
tyrant, whose lascivious sexual appetites, dishonest love of power, abuse of wealth, and
denigration of honor are unsurpassed. Given the regular social purview of eros, if one keeps the
exceptionalities of the tyrant and the philosopher firmly separate according to the moral or
ethical outcome of the person’s experience and use of eros, then there is clear precedent to
understand Platonic eros as existing on a spectrum from normal to exceptional in both respective
directions of philosopher and tyrant, good and bad, acceptable and not, or of divine blessing and
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base human ambition. That is, there is normal experience of eros, there is - in the bad direction exceptionally tyrannic eros, and - in the good direction - there is exceptionally philosophic eros.
But upon considering eros in the good and just city, where regular eros is relegated by the
divided soul/city and by behavioral stipulations to an inconsequential social position, if the rule
of the philosopher puts the exceptionally good eros at dangerous risk of becoming bad, then the
damnation of the tyrant’s eros may extend beyond the context of the just city and in fact
comment on the socialized status of eros at large, even for the philosopher. Perhaps humans
striving for the divine, longing after the transcendent and ineffable knowledge objects of truth, is
only evidence that praise of eros is praise of a fugue state, inexorably bound to be so unbearably
exceptional so as to be unattainable.
Of course, we can easily attribute both views to Plato and surmise that the project of
justice, the love of institutions and laws, requires further adventitious dialogic consideration
beyond the scope of the Republic to resolve the complexities of eros, especially the extent to
which it is socialized according to theoretical vs actual models. That is to say, one can
problematically conclude here that Plato presents multiple systems of thought which he changes
across time or context. Or one can argue that Socrates’ views of the tyrant’s eros are in fact
systemically sound within Plato’s corpus by insisting that tyrannical eros in the Republic is a
warning to all who would take up any philosophical endeavor, and who would risk using eros for
exceptional gains. The above interpretation, however, runs the risk of committing to either
ahistorical analyses or extrapolative generalizations.
Cinzia Arruzza makes the case that Plato’s moral psychology (as well as Athenian
customs and history and discourse) - when confronted with the politicization of eros - must
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differentiate eros from erotic appetites in order for the tyrant’s eros to be differentiated from the
eros of the philosopher.23 That is, the above exceptional risk is evident when one observes that
the philosopher aspires to rule with something akin to the clever villainy of the tyrant even as the
philosopher’s reason part of the soul also desires learning, wisdom, and truth. The tyrannical life
sees its fulfillment in absolute hedonistic freedom all while bearing resemblance to the
philosopher in terms of smartness and reasoning, but bears a clear difference in terms of which
part of the soul ultimately governs that reasoning. Arruzza explains this discrepancy by
evaluating the motivational and cognitive aspects of reason; the tyrant is a ‘denatured’
philosopher precisely because their motivation stems from the appetitive part of the soul while
their cognition - the reasoning part of the soul - remains only as highly trained and developed in
its own desire for, e.g. strategic power, as any cognitive capacity devoid of philosophic eros
would permit. The qualities which make a good philosopher also make an effective tyrant’s
cognition. But the exceptional uses of eros, specifically how eros permeates the entire soul and
causes motivational forces to coalesce with cognitive and calculating ones, enables us to more
easily differentiate philosopher from tyrant. Indeed Socrates reminds us the philosophers will
have to takeover as the city comes into full being (473c-d).
Nickolas Pappas aptly reminds Plato’s reader, however, that “Plato does not secretly
consider the Republic’s good city a tyranny… In the world that preoccupies Plato, the good city
will differ from a tyrannical regime as extremely as the philosophical soul differs from a
tyrannical soul.”24 Given that the analogical argument of the city/soul is bound to the tedious
Arruzza, Cinzia. "Clever Villains: The Tyrant’s Reason." A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in
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logic of relations between parts and wholes of wholly different things, Plato takes extra steps
when it comes to implicating the precariously similar risks of eros for the tyrant and the
philosopher. For as the just city or its philosopher ruler must devolve through four forms of
constitutional arrangements complete with parallel individuals' behavior (with democracy finally
lending itself to tyranny) so too would the eros of the philosopher need to diametrically
transform to resemble that of the tyrant. The institutions and constitution of the just city guards
the philosopher’s use of eros by more than just precarious risk, face resemblance, or chance. It
would seem, then, that the tyrant’s eros of Republic Book IX means something particular to the
city of words in that dialogue but also may arguably further heighten the implicit warning of the
Symposium and the explicit ones of the Phaedrus. In the former, Alcibiades cannot properly
motivate his reasoning with anything other than erotic appetites, essentially limiting his sight of
eros as a tension between lack of possession and its fulfillment, as his soul immaturely is bitten
and bites. In the Phaedrus, the training of the parts of the soul mean each part learns to discern
and motivate according to its distinct nature and innate aptitude. But Socrates also embeds within
the palinode of the Phaedrus a radical difference - according to the extent of success of the soul’s
charioteer in heaven to feed their soul on the essential reality of things - between the
philosopher’s and the tyrant’s pre-embodied soul. Yet both types eventually cannot keep up and
fall to earth, becoming embodied. The Republic in fact raises the stakes of the extraordinary
possibility that tyrannic eros might resemble, via the rise to rule, a love of institutions and laws,
and even knowledge, for what they offer in terms of power for oneself. Therefore the philosopher
must take exceptional care in training eros as workmate on earth precisely because Socrates
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largely excludes from the city of words the significance (save for a couple passing mentions) of
eros for anyone except the tyrant.
4. Desire and the Ineffable: The Demos in Statesman and Laws
Eros can drive humans toward the beautiful and the good; so long as the base disposition
of our most inhumane ambitions remains beholden unto reasonably ethical dispensations, the
driving power of our emotive and desiring cognition may align itself to an exceptionally
philosophical eros. The tyrant and the philosopher are, for Plato in the Republic, a subtle
difference of outcome and a dangerous similarity of motivation. The lover of wisdom and the
lover of self, may each find their self in positions of power and rulership so as to mistake their
capacity for lawgiving with their capacity for making sense of the world, and seizing the former
with the latter. The risk of eros gone wrong is nigh in the disposition (soul) and behavior of the
tyrant. The risk of eros gone right is only as rewarding as the philosopher’s extraordinary
discipline affords. In both cases what is innate in the soul is as critical as how one chooses to act,
especially because innate desire and learned behavior seem to form a synthetic dialectical
relationship. From the erotic dialogues to the Republic, Plato maintains an exceptional attitude
towards eros as workmate and desire as a critical component of his moral psychology for the
philosophical or good or examined life. In the latter dialogues such as the Philebus and Laws,
Plato concerns himself not with eros or desire outright, but rather with pleasure and pain and
emotion. In the Statesman, the success of the dialectical art of ruling is tied to the extent to which
humans have the capacity to be motivated to act politically and have volition in doing so. Plato’s
topical shift from desire and motivation to sensation and emotion heralds a move away from
discussing the philosophically exceptional towards discussing the possibility of the everyday and
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ordinary good life, especially by contexts of how that life may come forth by self-rule and state
law. Between the Statesman and the Laws, then, I amass an argument of how the lessons of eros
as companion for the philosophically minded person are only as significant as those lessons,
coming from a philosopher, implicate themselves in the everyday volition and behavior of
ordinary humans, at least insofar as ruling and lawgiving can stipulate volition and normative
behavior. To begin, this argument requires first to demonstrate a relationship between discussions
of desire and those of pleasure/pain.
Eros as a particular form of desire distinguishes itself from philia. Eros heralds the divine
while philia shows an intensely human affinity characterized by friendship. For Plato, the divine
aspirations of the examined life are congruent with his transcendental ideal metaphysics and the
proceeding epistemological structures which help one independently differentiate mere opinion
from absolute truth. In this way, philosophical eros seeks unity with being through possession of
knowledge while philia concerns itself with cooperative and non-possessive human affection. In
terms of desire, Socrates’ tripartite moral psychology of the Republic avoids the terminology of
eros and philia in favor of spirit, appetite, and reason. In the Republic, there is an analogical
impetus towards justice coming forth in the beautiful city when desire is ruled by reason. And
even where, in a realist reading of the parts of the soul, the logistikon makes evident its own
cognitive motivations, the existence of thymos in the soul and in the city seem to mark, in the
progression of Plato’s dialogues proposed by this thesis, a shift from the exceptional divine
aspirations of eros towards the tangible achievements of spirited desire as the source of virtues
like courage. This shift marks a movement from the theoretical origins of motivations for
behavior (i.e. types of desire and their interactions) towards the socially significant outcomes of
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desire (i.e. how the structures of desire inform not only the good life but also justice). That shift
finds it final form in the discussion of behavioral outcomes of motivation monitored via the
political impactions of the sensations of pleasure and pain. From theoretical source to lived
experience, from desire as motivation to reportable sensations which parallel behavior, this
expansion of Plato’s scope of psychological insight is thus critical for two reasons. First, from
the erotic dialogues, through the Republic, to the Statesman and the Laws, there is a marked
transformation as to what consequences psychological insight have for the many rather than for
the elite few. At first it means something akin to the divine and exceptional for the lover of
beauty, it is significant by way of justice emerging through the classes of the beautiful city, then
it is exceptionally dangerous for the philosopher when the risk of tyranny looms, and, finally,
psychological insight means something consequential for all who experience pleasure and pain,
albeit - for Plato’s purposes - insofar as that pleasure and pain have explicit political consequence
vis a vis self-mastery. Thus, second, Plato’s seemingly more pedestrian concern for pleasure/pain
exist in his arguments to bolster normative positions of lawgiving and ruling. That is, even
though eros - distinguished from other desires, and in conjunction with the moral tripartite or
bipartite psychology concerning itself primarily with justice and virtue - is still behind the
operation of philosophy that brings forth the best way to live, to rule, and to give laws, and
which has the broadest impetus of training the desires of the demos towards want and enactment
of virtue, Plato’s discussion of pain and pleasure is only for the many perhaps insofar as the
philosophizing elite inform discussion of politicized experiences attendant of the good life for
the regular citizen.
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The aims of this section are threefold: first I aim to show that the Eleatic Stranger’s myth
of the two ages in the Statesman postulates a politically empowering state of the human
condition, especially when considering that condition’s significance for the processes of diairesis
and dialectic, which are requisite to active kingship and ruling by law. Here, according to the
myth, our present age contrasts with past cosmic ages to the extent that volition, and arguably
desire, are necessary for the kind of engagement with the world which sees humans as
commanding their own way according to their own wants - and of course the guidance of their
rulers - rather than according to the automatic movements wrought by gods. Second, I aim to
show that Plato’s discussions of pleasure and pain in Laws Books I, II, and V are both a
congruent evolution of his earlier psychological systems and are the basis for the utilitarian
authority of all laws to inculcate strength of human will, honor, and courage towards the effort of
enacting virtues and living the good life for the entire demos. Plato’s psychological platform
which bases ethical goodness on monitoring and responding to the sensations of pain and
pleasure does not negate the tripartite moral psychology of the Republic; rather it expands the
discussion of how and why we ought to legally guide behavior with a socially prescient rearticulation of the soul’s embodied experiences of self-mastery, rather than its hidden sources of
motivational activity. Third, I comment on the distinctions of the divine and the human which
run throughout this thesis and which are critical to understanding the recuperative - or productive
- powers of human desire and will in the vast cosmos of being. Plato’s discussions of an
immortal soul and divine powers do not come to nought for the modern reader even when we
consider contemporary beliefs and the generally atheistic postulations concerning the meaning of
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our place in the cosmos. Rather, with a genealogical hermeneutic, any signification of the divine
easily translates into the power of the ineffable, which humans today very much still face.
4.1 The Myth of the Two Ages and the Statesman
In Plato’s Statesman, after finding an initial definition of the statesman unsatisfactory, as
rearer or herdsman of the two-footed featherless beings, the Eleatic Stranger argues that he and
young Socrates must begin at another point (268d). They are missing the component of an
individual’s logos or self-leading or volition. Legends of autochthonous birth, Hesiod’s golden
age, and the king-ship of Cronus all separately characterize the past with what is, according to
the Stranger, actually a common state of affairs (269a-c). The creator of the world saw fit to help
the cosmos move by its own necessity in a circle so that, being a thing unlike the divine that is
changeless, it may rotate in opposite directions, where each direction offers a different capacity
for bringing forth bodies in motion (269c-e). The Stranger begins by describing the first age in
retrograde: when that world-turning begins to turn back, humans grow younger and eventually
dissolve into the earth (270e). Similarly, in the forward movement of that kind of turning,
humans - being an earth-born race - returned to life from the earth (271a). Yet those humans,
being arranged and tended to by divine spirits, were different and more divine, having no need of
political constitutions, sexual relations, nor labor because the earth produced an abundance of its
own fruition (271e-272a). Being familiar with the present age, where such tending to humans by
gods does not occur, the Stranger questions which age is more fortunate (272b).
For if humans in the age of Cronus took advantage of their divine nursing and saw fit to
spend their time discussing philosophy, speaking with animals and each other, gathering
collective knowledge, and garnering wisdom, that age would be the more fortunate (272c). But if
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those humans spent their time gossiping and engorging food and drink, exchanging stories of the
sort we hear in legends, then, the Stranger says, it would be more difficult to argue which age is
more fortunate (272d). What is at stake is nothing less than the desires of humans in a primordial
or ideal state of nature being considered alongside the desires we know of in the present
(‘fallen’) age (272d). Yet it is by the demiurges’ allotment (or fate) and the world’s innate desire
that when the retrograde turning occurs to the extent that the turning is really a change in
fundamental and essential capacity, the gods let loose their charges and after great tumult the
world enters its present order (273a-b). Initially, the world remembers that age before and tries to
replicate it, but being bestowed with everything good as equally as with everything bad and
unjust, the capacity of the present-age human (and world) eventually forgets its prior self and its
disharmony comes to full flower (273c-d). Eventually, too, the creator sees that such admixture
is the opposite of great and - in the end of the world as we know it - turns the cosmos back to
being divinely charged, thus transforming that age of unlikeness and disease back into a world of
more automatic existence and divine stature for its humans (273d-e). Nevertheless, the age of
Zeus saw humans rise without resource or art, and were gifted some such things by the gods,
along with an indispensably inexorable didactic repose (274c-d).
Interpretation of the myth of two ages varies significantly and subtly with respect to how
the human condition intersects the question of volition and the activity of ruling. Using a
philological delineation between zoon and bios as well as an explication of the word automatos,
Michael Naas argues that Plato’s negation of these terms in the myth, “makes it not only possible
but necessary to understand the ideal in terms derived from that which is not the ideal.”25 The
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power of the myth is the power of the statesman to recollect both what it means to be alive and
spontaneous in the face of negation of the ideal, that is, the difference - absence and presence - of
life and volition between the two ages. Similarly, David White observes that the, “cyclical
sequence of opposites becomes essential in determining the nature of the king… The result [of
divine weaving] is a delicate harmony of opposites balancing the static perfection of a cosmos
defined by unlimited divine beneficence (the era of Cronus) and the chaos of complete cosmic
dissolution (the era of Zeus).”26 But White will go on to emphasize the ‘delicate harmony’ (over
Naas’ power of recollection) at work here and argue that the ‘mean’ of the two ages ultimately
mirrors the work of the statesman, “who combines opposites in order to produce the best
polity.”27 Gabor Betegh first questions the success of the myth where the Stranger could have
instead continued the process of diairesis and dialectic outright; second, posits that the myth
must be read as three ages in order to appreciate the difference between vertical and horizontal
sungeneia; and third, concludes,
Within the framework of the myth, the only way we can connect to the divine is through
the collective memory transmitted in stories about the age of Kronos, about how
divinities providentially equipped us with skills at the beginning of the present cosmic
period. Retelling these myths, and retelling them in the correct way, is to counteract
forgetfulness, which, just as in the case of the cosmos, leads to disconnect with the
divine, and falling into disorder. Yet, even if we must remain connected to it through
retelling myths, the divine is not presented in the Visitor’s narrative as an immediate
object of emulation. If anything, by separating divine herd-rearing of the human herd
from humans caring for humans, what the myth shows is that even the statesman cannot,
and indeed ought not try to, imitate Kronos.28
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Thus does Betegh emphasize mythic and real human distance from the ideal age divine, which,
while with proper retelling instills humans caring for one another, ultimately means - for Betegh
- emulation of the golden age is a nonstarter. Critically absent from Betegh’s reading (though one
may find it by implication) is the significance of opposition through retelling of myth, especially
those incipient to the present age, and not those of Cronus which deal with how leaders might
overcome forgetfulness and the problem of evil through their own active rule.
Recalling how desire produced a different kind of action and care for the world in an age
of divine goodness informs how the statesman properly accounts for human volition in the act of
ruling, particularly when ruling is characterized by the task of caring for a living human herd not
by techne of rearing but by weaving the control of laws and all aspects of the city together (305be). Young Socrates and the Stranger subliminally recall that innate desire of the world to exist
across two fundamentally opposed conditions by delineating the rhythmic sharpness of
masculinity and courage from the excessive and manic softness of cowardice and lethargy
(306e-307c). The latter amounts to swaths of people whose disposition makes them difficult to
rule because of their tendency to become enslaved by their own passions and by the ambition of
others (307d-308a). It is the duty of the statesman to weave together the good beings with the
bad ones to unite in virtue all classes of volition (308d). It belongs to the statesman to interweave
the warp and the woof, according to his unique capacity to educate that moderation bred with
moderation ultimately lends itself to sluggishness, and that, instead, intertwining the opposites of
courage and moderation, those divine and human elements in the age of Zeus felt in the soul, will
produce an even exercise of power throughout the polity (310b-311c).
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The seat of virtue is the soul, which is by its nature both immortal and of the divine, as
well as changing and embodied as human. The bifurcation of the condition of the soul is not
explicit in the Stranger’s myth, yet it is nevertheless exploited subliminally in his subsequent
arguments, as the essence of good rule is learning how to unify things fundamentally opposed. It
is here that the above three interpretations of the myth each contribute something crucial.
Inferring the ideal from its absence, playing opposites for a golden mean of harmonious
intercourse, and instilling a didactic sense of collective memory in lieu of ruling through
emulation of the ideal - all coalesce in the concluding pages of the dialogue in order for the
statesman to emerge. Nevertheless, something as practical as the statesman’s royal, if not divine,
weaving in the face of human disharmony forgoes the radical implications of moral psychology
for moderating human behavior instead through the active dispensation of power via the
banalities of bureaucracy. That is, I suggest that the myth’s power lies in the subtle forcefulness
which delineates the entirety of what it means to be human - regardless of the cosmic age - in the
face of divine enterprise. To give a ruler their platform based on the absence of an ideal, a
harmonious mean, or the power of mythic recollection is not what the Statesman as a whole
suggests. Rather, human ingenuity to overcome the imperfections of its immortal soul’s
embodied motion, of moral relativism, and of piecemeal ethical systems, results from the innate
desire to effect change and from the aspirations towards (or imagination of) something divine
and ineffable to wit that change seeks its end. The myth of two ages puts that divine enterprise
within the grasp of humanity for at least half the time and in so doing says something more
radical about human desire and volition than Plato in the Statesman alone is willing to let on: the
potential for fearfully, or even carefully, misplacing divine origins as perpetual causes of human
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force for change, that is the power of remembrance, means that intelligently amassing desires
unto reasonable action is not sufficient to manifest the forever good within any single articulation
of knowledge nor any rule of self or others. Instead, desire as forgetful flux is the very state of
imperfection which makes the endeavor of ideal living as from ineffable virtues possible. The
Statesman thus may suggest an immanent metaphysics that complicates what Socrates says in the
Republic of a gap between being and becoming. Perhaps the forms do not exist to aspire to know
and live by except when human failing as volition dominates the conditions of the age and soul.
4.2 Pleasure, Pain, Virtue, and Self-Rule
Plato will often, such as extensively in the Phaedo and briefly in the Cratylus, treat the
soul in the early dialogues as a singular entity which animates the body. The explicit division of
the soul in the Republic permits Socrates to make analogical arguments concerning the beautiful
city, its classes of citizens, and their proper roles. Characterizing the soul as a charioteer who
guides and trains his noble and ignoble horses in the Phaedrus permits Socrates to draw
categorical lines of earthly, ethical good upon divine-aspiring onto-epistemological possibilities
of who one is and how one knows once embodied - all anticipated by the experiences of beauty
and other essences of existences by the soul in heaven. Between the Republic, Phaedrus, and the
Laws, the act in words of articulating the soul ultimately contribute psychological insight for
living the good life, while each also imparts a specific glance towards the good, that is, a specific
argumentative tack, which is complete with its own unique potential pitfalls and ethical
implications. In the Laws Book I, the soul is described as being pulled in tension by two chords.
One of the dragging forces is golden and holy; it transmits the power of calculation and public
law (644e-645a). The other force is tough and inflexible like iron, being constituted by many
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substances; it resists the force exerted by law and is un-cooperative with the pull of the golden
chord (645a). The point of this fable of the soul as puppet is to signify the terms ‘self-superior’
and ‘self-inferior’ (645b). The aim here is for the individual citizen to digest the truth of these
forces that pull them into virtue and vice (645b-c); the individuals’ internal forces both coalesce
into collective action as state law and clarify the personal subjects of education, symposium, and
other practices, which go hand in hand with the sensations of pleasure and pain (653a-b). For it is
by these sensations that virtue and vice enter the soul (653a).
The division of the soul in the Laws is physically and conceptually incomplete. It is not
constituted by real, deflationist, or metaphorical parts but rather characterized by ‘forces in
tension.’ This tension provides the Laws’ discussants, according to Susan Sauvé Meyer, the
opportunity for two readings, or opinions: (1) Clinias holds that the conflicted soul lends itself to
behavior, as the golden chord surmounts the forces of the iron. (2) The Athenian holds that the
harmonious soul lends itself to behavior, as its internal focus agree according ones’ reasoning
over and learning from pleasure and pain.29 And while Meyer argues that these two models, that
of conflict and that of harmony, are irreconcilable in the Laws, the rendering of the soul’s
potentially unsavory forces into ‘a composition resembling a variety of substances’ permits Josh
Wilburn to postulate a conceptual relation, specifically to appetite and thymos, in the tripartite
soul of the Republic, and thereby show the Laws’ characterization of a soul with tensions is in
fact a continuation of Plato’s larger argument for moral education.30 The search for civic qualities
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within something innate to the human condition certainly seems to be the Laws’ discussants’ aim
at the beginning of Book II. The unnamed Athenian will explicitly call ‘education,’
[The] initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and
affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses
before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does understand, his reason and
his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of
appropriate habits. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion. But there is one
element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our
feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate we ought to hate from first to last, and
love what we ought to love.31 (653b-c)
Such ‘correct formation of pleasure and pain’ is indeed what Meyer calls the harmony reading of
the soul in the Laws; it not only dominates the subsequent conversation, with Clinias assenting
and thereby diminishing his behavioral model of conflict in the soul, but it also represents a
certain evolution of Socrates’ tripartite division: an evolution which favors the individuals’
capacity to know their self over the city’s function - by rule of the guardian’s distinct soul/class
authority - to instill justice and virtue. Plato reiterates at length a point from the Republic: that a
sense of order from the gods is instilled by rhythm through ritualistic music, singing, and dance
(653d). In the prelude to the topic of legislation in Book V, the discussants again take up the
question of correctness - that pleasure and pain, taken in the correct manner, are guides to
normative behavior and the good life (732e). The Athenian’s answer to this question involves
first the delineation of the noble from the average from the base. Second, the Athenian argues
that life’s choices bestow the opportunity for a calculated and virtuous hedonism; the life of
noble pleasure is the general standard which the specific codes of law aspire to inculcate. But
ultimately, at least according to the principle of utilitarian hedonism, the ability to self-rule both
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suggests itself in the spirit of the state laws and precedes the law in the form of virtue attained
through self-mastery and self-rule. Therefore rule of state law is secondary, in the Laws’ course
of ethics in Book V, to the citizen’s capacity for self-rule.
Now, as for the philosophical evolution from the erotic dialogues, through the Republic,
to the Laws with respect to desire, I claim that Plato’s views gradually mature to acquiesce to an
accessible system of moral psychology whereby desire is transformed from the exceptional
avenues of manic love of beauty, to a careful weighing of risks of the exceptional for rule of the
demos by the few, finally to a postulation that everyday feeling and sensation best informs the
good life for the ordinary citizen, let alone preambles all nomos. With the more mature Plato
seems to come the possibility that the examined life is not alone defined by rigorous
philosophical endeavors, except insofar as the endeavors of one’s life involve introspection,
contemplation, and renewed action, i.e. education. Yet regardless of which Platonic period of
dialogues one observes, mastering one’s desires seems at most - in terms of eros - the core and
pride of Platonic philosophy’s love for beauty, wisdom, the good, for virtue, and for the forms,
and at least, that a specific mastery of pleasure over pain - the sensations felt alongside desire
like sinew to flesh - seem critical to true happiness. In this particular reading of Plato, the stakes
seem so lowered through the evolution from the inimitable lover, to the reprehensible tyrant (and
exceptional philosopher), towards the ordinary citizen of the demos, that something crucially
divine-aspiring may be lost. Indeed, the Athenian in the Laws Book V will model the first - albeit
unachievable - city after one led by divine powers. What is the modern reader to make of the
seemingly esteemed and sometimes fundamental presence of the divine at work in Platonic
philosophy?
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4.3 Divine Power, Human Desire, and the Ineffable
In Plato’s dialogues, arguments relating relatively novel postulations of being, knowing,
and virtue to long-standing issues of history, myth, and primordial origins exhibit Socrates’
valuation of continuity with, and respect and careful criticism of knowledge of the divine.
Oftentimes, the question of deities’ reputed power, past deeds, and ongoing presence is
inseparable from Socratic silence, where arguments only find their searched-for conclusion with
heavy qualifications of tantamount ignorance already embedded.32 Socrates in the Euthyphro
ultimately decides that the dilemma of piety - determining whether piety originates with the
practices of the gods or with human praise - yields a vicious circle of reasoning; therefore
investigating the question of piety can result in knowing its quality and not its nature (11a-b).
Elsewhere, in the Timaeus and the Statesman, Plato seems to more easily posit a cosmic creator
or great demiurge while skirting the ontological mechanics of lesser gods’ legendary or ongoing
powers, those with which humans like Socrates ought to praise or contend with. Indeed, as the
Apology recounts, Socrates is condemned for blaspheming the gods and thereby corrupting the
youth. The gods - and more importantly the socially and politically prescient existence of divine
power - are nevertheless critical for Socrates throughout Plato’s corpus. In the Republic, Socrates
proposes, perhaps ironically, that the vast amount of literature which depicts the gods as
committing unholy or bad deeds ought to be banned in the beautiful city. Total mentions of the
gods, immortal being, the demiurge, the heavens, daimons, and the divine throughout Plato’s
dialogues are too numerous to fully evaluate here.
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Instead, as already put forth in this thesis, the divine intersects the presentation of human
desire, its relation to being and knowing, in such a way so as to make absolutely transcendental
knowledge - formally unchanging objects of knowledge - contingent on the human flux of desire
in order to grasp at let alone obtain. I suggest that these divine elements strategically serve to
requisition early Greek religious practices and beliefs towards the endeavor of validating ontoepistemic positions through the Classical period and therefore essentially serve to bolster Plato’s
systems of thought with a then socially prescient power and with the longer-lasting foundation in
the immutable, abstract, absolute, and ineffable.33 But this endeavor is also bent towards
validating the human as having at least the aspiration of divinity within them and at most the
very ontic capacity of something which traverses the human and divine, becoming and being,
opinion and knowledge: Diotima’s eros as intermediary daimon and divine desire in the immortal
soul. That is, something innate to humanity - perhaps the hallmark of humanity - is not human
failing or lack or awe in the face of the power of the divine - but the drive towards knowing and
being and living with those things postulated to exist eternally and fundamentally beyond its
grasp. As if, by mere postulation of eternal objects of knowing and essences of being, Plato was
condemning the Athenian cult praise of gods and hoping to put something quasi-theistic and
more reasonable in its place.
Perhaps more than merely logically validating or socially codifying Plato’s arguments,
the intensity of relation to the divine serves as a measure of success of the examined and good
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life’s social activities. Plato’s works perform the task of appealing to the social practices of
religion and transform those outward acts of religious fervor into contemplative and introspective
acts of insight into the ineffable.34 One might object to an equivocation of Greek divinity with a
culturally pluralistic rational spirituality or theism, but the aspiration towards forms of virtue what disparate ethic systems might share in common - seem to be more in line with Plato’s
intentions concerning the virtue-forms’ resistance to espousing doctrinal truths. That is, perhaps
the divine is a measure of properly experiencing the rational processes of knowing something
beyond the threshold of what it means to be merely human, even as Plato’s theistic concerns
regularly seek to ground that threshold in the throes of human desire or volition (e.g. the myth of
the two ages informing the emergence of the statesman). That the drive to know how to live the
good life is tantamount to aspiring to be like what may be imagined of divine powers’ ability to
institute the good is neither soteriological, elegiacal, teleological, nor a merely ethical drive. The
Socratic wish for the stories of the gods to inform human drives with a sense of propriety (i.e. to
inform individual virtue and collective justice) becomes a Platonic matter of myth and later law,
and what to make of myth and law via calculably normative responses to conflict can falter to
become an all-too-human desire for greater power. Hence the immutable ineffable is the source
from which human desire comes forth and the bulwark against it is measured.
5. Conclusion
If eros is the divining rod of Platonic philosophy, and human drives writ-large are the flux
and crux upon which any citizen of the demos can fashion their happiness, then the good and
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examined life so beloved and sought-after by Socrates starts with understanding how one’s desire
is tantamount to understanding how the ineffable reality of things impacts both one’s
conceptualization of meaning and feeling of belonging in the world with purpose. The methods
of this thesis evolved from topical comparison between dialogues to genealogical interpretations
of multiple dialogues’ contrasting yet arguable congruent suggestions and postulations. Plato’s
Symposium and Phaedrus, both early efforts of his long career, collectively force the modern
reader to question their understanding of eros, extending the purview of erotic desire to include
the socialized force of yearning for knowledge of beauty itself which transcends the timely love
that besets their eyes. Socrates’ model of the beautiful city and tripartite soul in the Republic
strives ultimately for justice; it does not have the patience for besetting unto its entire demos the
tedious task of climbing Diotima’s ladder. The risk of eros faltering is too great. In the
Statesman, Plato demonstrates the significance of human rule by a myth wherein eros, human
drives, even the innate desire of the cosmos is of such a nature so as to be led half the time by
divine beneficence rather than being left to its own devices of politics, arts, and philosophy.
Finally, in the Laws, pleasure and pain are the socialized sensations which most easily coral
virtue unto proper and correct self-rule, even lending themselves to the divine-inspired state laws
and its stipulated education, which in any case would inculcate that very emotional intelligence.
In the end, the innate want to communicate meaning with what transcends human life, and one’s
capacity for understanding in mere words, drives our desires to become reasoned and tempered
yet capable of being bellowed by the intense feeling of eros and by the strategic preservation of
pleasure over pain. Desire informs philosophy only insofar as the driving sensations of lived
experiences can inform the ineffable aspects of any comprehension emerging thereby from the
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examined life. Desire itself is key to this possibility, but desire trained - according to Plato inevitably results in the good life.
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